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October 20, 2008

Open Source Software? Yes. Hardware and Services as Well

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Open sourcing your software makes sense. So does open sourcing your hardware, and your services, too.

Why do it? Open sourcing is tough to make money at, per se. Where the profits come from is the knowledge you gain by being the center of the action relating to your project, whether it be software, hardware or services.

References

Cook, Scott. The Contribution Revolution. Letting Volunteers Build Your Business. Harvard Business Review. October 2008. 60.

Thompson, Clive. Build It. Share It. Profit. Wired. November 2008. 166.

Business Plan Pitch: Focus on the Non-verbal

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Pitching a business plan? Consider (Business Briefing, R2):

  • It's hard to fake excitement about your plan. Make sure it shows.
  • If they can't wait to break into your conversation, they're listening. Listening is good.
  • If they are mirroring your gestures, that's a good sign. Mirroring is innate. Everybody notices what's going on. Take advantage of it.
  • People can read your fluidity, the consistency of your presentation. Practice far in advance. People notice.

The bottom-line: Face to face dialogs are where the decisions get made. If you are attempting to work via email, reconsider your strategy. Spend more time at the water cooler.

Reference

Executive Briefing. The Power of Nonverbal Communication. Wall Street Journal. 20 October 2008. R2. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122426675804545129.html

Out of a Bust, a Prescription

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Two key facts (Engardio, 23):

  1. The assumption that innovation and productivity alone will sustain the American standard of living may prove erroneous.
  2. Real incomes have declined over the last decade, even as productivity increased.

Two interesting solutions:

  1. Look for more state - and international support for - investment in production capacity in growth industries like autos (yes, there is growth coming), nanotech, and renewable energy.
  2. That support will likely flow to companies in GDP producing industries: you've got to make something to survive.

Two interesting opportunities:

  1. Position your company as a problem-solver in industries that will support high-paying, high technology jobs that create wealth.
  2. Use that positioning to team with the government in high capitalization industries. Look for more government regulation in financial industries and manufacturing industries. If the government is going to provide subsidies, they are going to require new efficiencies that increase productivity - and GDP.

Reference

Engardio, Pete. Forget Adam Smith. Whatever Works. BusinessWeek. 27 October 2008. 22. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_43/b4105022816429.htm

October 19, 2008

When Values Go Wildly Awry

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The financial crisis we are witnessing today was fed by greed, lack of leadership, lack of controls, and a whole lot more. All this has happened before. sometimes at some of the most well known companies in America. Sometimes, it is hard to remember that well-respected people were making all sorts of bad decisions, decisions that sometimes led to personal and business failure.

Archer Daniels Midland Company has been a well respected pillar of the chemical, food and agricultural community for a long time. Things were wrong there in the early nineties. ADM's story is important because it reminds us that, while things have gone wrong today what with the financial mess we are experiencing, they have gone wrong in the past as well. That this has gone on in the past is not a pretty reality exactly.

The story boils down to this: a president of a division at ADM was stealing from the company to the tune of about ten million dollars over some years. To cover his tracks, he made up a story about someone from abroad threatening his family - and called the FBI. The FBI investigated, and, to continue to cover his tracks, the president reveals a whole series of illegal indiscretions the company has made and that he was privy to: price-fixing on an international scale and theft of company funds on a large scale (Eichenwald,30).

The story is intriguing and interesting. The facts are proven. People went to jail. Careers were ruined. That's all well and good.

The message of all this, while blatant, is subtle at the same time. Let's call it the "slippery slope" we are all so used to.

At ADM a culture grew in which both theft and price-fixing were accepted. Everyone did it. No one objected. It appears that some people left, but not many. The FBI was astounded that one person would reveal so much - the president of a division, no less - and further, that no else in this very large scheme even considered saying "This is wrong, we've got to stop," much less called the FBI. Some of the players were internationally known business leaders with contacts very high in the federal government. OK, greed played a role. The "I deserve more - this is a good way to get it," mentality grew too large. Lots of people participated.

This book should be required reading for all sorts of managers. Business schools should require it. Why? Because it reminds us all how easy it is for things to go very wrong in the management of a company. It happened to ADM. It can happen to your company, or mine, as well.

Reference

Eichenwald, Kurt. The Informant. A True Story. Broadway Books. 2000.

Retailer Strategy: More Than Location

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Gap is a specialty casual retailer; Old Navy is a value-oriented family store; Banana Republic is a moderately priced designer retailer (Rubinfeld, 299). 

You knew that already. But Gap, Old Navy and Banana Republic didn't know that until Paul Pressler left Disney and moved to Gap Inc. His first move was to clearly define the core values of each of the brands.

Once you know what the value of your retail operation is, now figure out how to turn your brand's values into growth. Rubinfeld plotted out the growth of Starbucks early on in his tenure during the period when Starbucks grew from one hundred to four thousand stores. Values first, yes; then lay out a framework that takes those values to the mundane of such issues as store daily opening and closing. Starbucks uses demographics to choose locations. Then it examines the parking lot of suitable locations. Oil on the tarmac? Good. That's evidence of lots of traffic which helps build sales. Cluster your stores. Budget opening properly. They've thought of it all (Ehrenfeld, 7).

Innovation is part of all this. Your insights - especially in retail - define your innovation path (Rubinfeld, 300) :

  • Prove you have the license to expand the category or enter a new one by planning far in advance.
  • Time your entry properly. Now, what with the changing financial statistics related to recession, might be a good time to dust off old plans and re-examine the possibilities that you have had time to consider before. Things, obviously, will turn around eventually.
  • Finally, if you are abandoning your current demographic or expanding in to a related one, make sure your plan - and your products and facilities - make enough room for profits in the new one.

References

Ehrenfeld, Tom. Starbucks and the Power of Story. How the coffee retailer uses its own narrative to brew global success. strategy+business. 10 October 2008. http://www.strategy-business.com/press/article/08211?pg=0

Rubinfeld, Arthur and Collins Hemingway. Built for Growth. Expanding Your Business Around the Corner or Across the Globe. Wharton School Publishing. 2005.

October 14, 2008

Strategic Realignment

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Steven Jobs always gets the easy jobs.

  • Create a new industry with the personal computer.
  • Implement new technology for the first time with the MacIntosh computer.
  • Battle with a CEO - and lose - in his battle with John Sculley.
  • Return to a broken company with the aim of turning things around. 

In the first quarter of 1996, Apple Computer lost $69 million, laid off 1,300 staffers, fired their CEO, and, finally, brought in Gil Amelio as the new CEO. Amelio continued to cut out the pork in Apple's operation by reducing the number of projects from three hundred to about fifty. Amelio needed a new operating system for the Mac so he bought Jobs' NeXT computer because its operating system was up and running and perfect for the Mac. Apple had forty different product lines, a confusing, unfocused array that needed culling.

After a series of losing quarters, the Board asked Amelio to leave and hired Jobs as CEO (Kahney, 22).

When Jobs came on board, Apple had forty product lines. His job: reduce the forty to the profitable few. Make a profit. Now. How'd he do it?

Job's Seven Key "Realignments" (Kahney, 26-33)

  • Replace most of the Board with tech industry allies, including Larry Ellison from Oracle.
  • Resolve the suit with Microsoft about similarities between Apple's operating system and Microsoft's. Persuade Mircosoft to invest in Apple to show good will.
  • Hired a new marketing company - TBWA/Chiat/Day - to create a new, bold marketing campaign.
  • Dump the clone business relationships. No more non-Apple computers shipped with the Apple operating system.
  • Simplify the pipeline. Just four products for the company: Consumer Portable and Desktop and Professional Portable and Desktop. Every thing else got dumped, including a very profitable printer business.
  • Refocus the suppliers (IBM and Motorola) so they provided concessions he wanted and supported Apple going forward.
  • Finally, he re-focused on the twenty-five million current customers of Apple. They were the foundation for the re-emergence of Apple.

The biggest change of all: Jobs focused the company on the four product lines, trimmed any remaining fat and began again, all without all the bravado and temper tantrums he was known for.

The iPod and the iPhone were in the future. The initial steps of focus in 1997 and 1998 laid the groundwork for future success.

Reference

Kahney, Leander. Inside Steve's Brain. Portfolio. 2008.

October 13, 2008

The First Fall of Lehman Brothers

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I got hold of  a list of the "best non-fiction business books ever written" back in July (Nocera), not knowing that the list promised some amazing - and timely - reading. I've read about containers on ships, the movie business (twice), the New York Times, the sixties, the eighties, the nineties, you name it, it's in the list.

So, the latest book (Auletta) is scaring the day-lights out of me, I've got to admit. Our savings are tanking in the stock market, and I am reading a very exact description about the first time Lehman Brothers failed, in fact, the time Lehman Brothers first left its partnership business form and was purchased by another entity after 134 years of continuous operation In New York City.

Yes, I lived through this when it was in the papers. I suppose I am supposed to remember the facts. Maybe I did a little bit. But I never knew the story, the real story about what happened.

Auletta makes the case that it was greed that brought Lehman Brothers down.

For me, the failure of Lehman wasn't about greed, it was about power. Lewis Gluckman saw what he assumed was weakness in the current Chairman, Peter Peterson. He pushed, and he pushed, and he pushed until Peterson was gone, and he was in charge, able to do what he darn well pleased. Gluckman forgot a couple things. Yep, he'd been a wonderful Mr. Inside - he knew how to run the operations side of things. He thought that was all that mattered. Wrong. Mr. Outside - Peterson - was just as, if not more, important as he brought in the business and expanded what they already had. Some bad bets, combined with a downturn, put Lehman on the ropes within months after Gluckman's successful "coup" forcing a sale after nine months of Gluckman's tenure.

Amazing, sad, scary - all at one time. And the story isn't that different from this go around at Lehman. It is clear that history does provide guidance, if only we took the time to remember it.

Reference

Auletta, Ken. Greed and Glory on Wall Street. The Fall of the House of Lehman. Warner Books. 1986.

Nocera, Joe. The Best Business Books Ever? New York Times. 17 July 2008. http://executivesuite.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/17/the-best-business-books-ever/?hp

Let Folks Contribute

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Scott Cook, the co-founder of Intuit, talks about a very specific add-on to the TurboTax website that some of his managers didn't expect to work very well. It was simple, actually, a Q&A community built in the the 2007 version of TurboTax on-line (Cook, 67).

Five weeks into the Q&A's test period, they were ready to score it a success. In 2008, they added another section to the site, a user review section. Expectations were for complaints. Didn't happen. The vast bulk of the responses were positive (Cook, 67). Good news.

Why do folks contribute (Cook, 68)?

  • They don't realize they are.
  • They want their practical solutions implemented quickly.
  • Interaction is its own reward.
  • Reputation enhancement.
  • Expression
  • Give back to your community.

Finally, what are the keys to making you community enhanced site work better - or to get your at-work community to happily contribute (Cook, 69)?

  • Take your time.
  • Don't expect a lot early on
  • Celebrate your successes
  • Use the process to experiment
  • Let folks "vote" on what they like best and find most useful.
  • This could be a bottom-up process - seek buy-in from the whole organization only after you've had some successes.

We're thinking of applying this process to two opportunities:

  • Creating a red team web site to respond to economic development opportunities where no response is a normal response.
  • Creating a community of communities who are inundated with abandoned homes because of the mortgage crisis with the ultimate goal of managing the sales process of abandoned homes so they end up being owner occupied, not renter occupied. This ensures that the community will grow healthy - and more valuable - more quickly (See Rundle).

What opportunities do you see?

References

Cook, Scott. The Contribution Revolution. Letting Volunteers Build Your Business. Harvard Business Review. October 2008. 60.

Rundle, Rhonda L. California Officials Try to Avoid Second Housing Hit. Wall Street Journal. 7 October 2008. A8. http://www.wsj.com/article/SB122334317101810201.html

The Fat Tail Strikes Again

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"... social panics occur when large groups can't discern reliable sources of advice from unreliable ones (Cloud, 15)."

"In the middle years of this decade, we had negative real short-term interest rates. And that really means free money, which really distorts the system. Capitalism is premised on the idea that capital is a scarce commodity rationed with a price mechanism. ... People all over the housing and financial service industries figured out ways to lever themselves up way too far (Bartiromo, 22)."

"In the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ... Their massive lobbying machines thwarted every legislative attempt at reform (Rickards)."

"The problem is that Wall Street and regulators relied on complex mathematical models that told financial institutions how much risk they were taking at any given time, ... a colossal conceptual error: the belief that risk is randomly distributed and that each event has no bearing on the next event in a sequence (Rikards)."

"Since we have scaled the system to unprecedented size, we should expect catastrophes of unprecedented size as well (Rikards in Crovitz)."

Flip a coin. What are the odds that it will be a heads? Fifty percent. We all knew that. And we'd be right, at least most of the time.

The folks who make financial models for investment strategies have basically assumed the same thing. Every event is not related to any other event. Flip a coin. It's fifty-fifty whether it will be heads or tails. Every time. That's the assumption.

More complex situations muddy the math, but, basically, statisticians have always operated under the assumption that events were not related. They used those same assumptions when creating complex financial models to predict whether an investment would pan out. Most time, they were right.

Long-Term Capital Management made that assumption in the nineties. Trying to predict the volatility of the market, they assumed that volatility was a constant and could be predicted, or at least managed (Lowenstein, 68). They predicted that a group of bonds were good investment, even in an extremely volatile market. They invested on that assumption, big time. Not only did they invest their cash, they borrowed money to invest. That's called leverage. It is supposed to be a good thing in the right hands.

LTCM was sure that the investment was a good one, even as the volatility increased. The effect of the volatility, especially as other investors abandoned the investment, was that their leverage effectively increased. Now leverage can be good.

LTCM's leverage at its peak was one hundred to one (Lowenstein, 191) - one dollar invested of their money, ninety-nine dollars invested of someone else's money, money they would ultimately have to repay. Leverage is great if things go well. Leverage is not so great if things go wrong.

LTCM's market began to collapse with the collapse of Russian bonds in 1998. Their leverage foretold their ultimate demise. It was underlined by the fact that when LTCM bet, they bet big. Their bets were so big, in fact, that they couldn't unload them on the way down, because that unloading would have moved the markets even lower, yet. Ultimately, it took a near $3 billion investment to right LTCM. It survived. Everyone was supposed to remember that events are not independent. Panic ruled the bond market on a day when LTCM assumed it wouldn't. They couldn't abandon their positions quickly enough and got left holding the bag. It was a huge bag filled with bad investments.

The Fat Tail

One last thing about LTCM's assumptions.

They assumed that the bell curve of their variable went to zero out at the positive and negative extremes based upon their rationale that their assumptions were independent of other assumptions. They were wrong. Only approximately ninety-nine percent of the time do variables have zero percent extremes.

In times of panic, their extremes fall to one percent, not zero. That means that, inevitably, their projections will be different than they expected. When they're wrong, and they're leveraged, the losses are huge. Just like they were in 1998 - and in 2008. That's called panic.

What's that got to do with the fluctuations in the market in the last couple weeks?

  • Bad information caused the markets to fall rapidly as folks assumed they were better off out of the market rather than waiting to see how things would shake out.
  • Bad management of interest rates led some financial firms to create a market in mortgages that they shouldn't have been allowed to create.
  • People bought too many of the new mortgages, then abandoned them when the markets made their investments in their homes worthless.
  • The market grew huge faster than was expected, so huge, in fact, that no could get out without going bankrupt.

And bankrupt they went. We'll see how it all shakes out. Looks like someone is going to make a huge investment. I suspect it will be you and I. We all paniced. We all lost - big time.

References

Bartiromo, Maria. Blackrock's Peter Fisher On When the Pain Will End. BusinessWeek. 20 October, 2008. 21. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_42/b4104000808352.htm 

Cloud, John. The Moment. 10/06/08. Time. 20 October 2008. 15. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1848734,00.html

Crovitz, L. Gordon. The 1% Panic. Wall Street Journal 13 October 2008. A17. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122385689217827341.html

Lowenstein, Roger. When Genius Failed. The Rise and Rall of Long-Term Capital Management. Random House. 2000.

Rickards, James G. A Mountain, Overlooked. Washington Post. 13 October 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR2008100101149.html

October 07, 2008

Oil Boomers - Scoundrels or Saints?

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The Civil War made a lot of people rich, John D. Rockefeller among them. He started as a trader in commodities (salt, clover seed, timothy seed and pork) and ended up a wealthy man. He was still in his twenties (Chernow, 71). During that period, Rockefeller learned one crucial technique, namely, how to make the railroads compete for your business. Since his commodities business had lots of shipping needs, and there were a myriad of railroads available - too many, really, as a shakeout had not yet occurred - Rockefeller attained the lowest price possible on his company's shipping. While later in life Rockefeller would shun debt financing of his business's growth, during the Civil War period he borrowed as need be. His lenders became his mentors, always helping him focus on the need to repay every loan he took. Yes, it was serious business for Rockefeller, but at the same time a joyous business. It was, truly, fun (Chernow, 68).  

During the same period that Rockefeller was building his business, he was also building his life. He married and began to grow a family. Just as importantly, he build a serious relation with his church, becoming an unfailing supporter of his church (the Erie Street Baptist Mission Church) in Cleveland (Chernow, 77).

He formed alliances with the railroads to secure kickbacks on his and others shipments of oil from the oil regions and refinery regions of Western Pennsylvania and Ohio to the East Coast, and then on to the world. The key word here was kickbacks. Since there weren't laws yet against such kickbacks, Rockefeller didn't mind plunging ahead with them no matter what his competitors thought.

Depending on your point of view, Rockefeller became, even this early in his career, either a religious homebody living a saintly life, or a scoundrel living on the spoils of other's work. As he retired thirty or forty years later, it still wasn't clear, and, basically, we still have a choice to make about it all. The government, finally, with the anti-trust legislation and court challenges and wins, forced the issue and broke up the empire that Rockefeller so carefully created. Rockefeller became a philanthropist - Churchill recognized Rockefeller for his generosity and discernment in science (St. Louis Post Dispatch) - who supported universities all over the country.

There was one final, saintly act that is forgotten, even in today's tumultuous financial markets. It was Rockefeller, in combination with federal money directed by Theodore Roosevelt, that turned the tide in the panic of 1907. J. P. Morgan got most of the credit. Rockefeller, quietly, supplied a lot of the funds that staunched the panic (Chernow, 544).

By order of the U.S. Supreme Court in May 1911, Standard Oil broke into thirty-four separate companies. We're not going to analyze here how well that split-up actually worked, as the entities were still owned by the same stockholders. There is, however, an interesting fact buried in the thirty four new companies created. Standard Oil of New Jersey inherited refineries, oil tankers, and marketing apparatus. It did not, however, inherit any oil to refine, ship or market. That spelled opportunity for another producer who had a lot of oil with no place to sell it (Davis, 77).

Edward L. Doheny had been developing oil fields in Mexico. In 1910 and 1911 his company had a couple gushers, a lot of oil, and no where to sell it. Standard Oil of New Jersey became one of the buyers for the Mexican oil, saving Doheny's company during the early development of the new fields in Mexico (Davis, 77).

Rockefeller's was a circuitous story with ups and downs all along the way. Doheny's wasn't much different. Revolution in Mexico ultimately made Doheny's ownership of the oil fields risky, as the Mexican government was interested in nationalizing them. In support of the Tampico oil fields, the U. S. Navy blockaded the port of Veracruz and supported American interests. The U. S. wanted the oil (Davis, 96).

Now, the Doheny story would have been a good Los Angeles boy makes good story except for one debacle that happened in the twenties, the Tea Pot Dome scandal. While finally found not guilty to all the counts against him, Doheny had hoped that his professional career wouldn't be judged by on scandal. It was not to be. Donheny spent his last years in declining health.

In contrast, Rockefeller targeted a one-hundred year life. He died in 1937 at ninety-seven, feeble, but bright to the end (Chernow, 674).

References

Chernow, Ron. Titan. The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. Random House. 1998. 

Davis, Margaret Leslie. Dark Side of Fortune. Triumph and Scandal in the Life of Oil Tycoon Edward L. Doheny. University of California Press. 1998.

Gold, Russell. Market Slide Puts a Spotlight on Big Oil's Cash Hoard. Wall Street Journal. 7 October 2008. B1.

St. Louis Post Dispatch, 8 July 1936.

September 23, 2008

Making a Baja Port Pencil Out

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Mexico wants to build a port in Baja to compete with the ports in Long Beach and Los Angeles. Dickerson nicely lays out all the positives and negatives here.

So why would anyone build a port south of the border for the American market? We don't have the financial numbers. I'll bet that they pencil out OK for the right investor, especially given the forty-five year term of the lease on the harbor. Deep pockets are involved. Maybe we accept that. Now comes the hard part.

Why would the shippers want to use the port? Since the inception of the containerized shipping industry in the fifties and its growth in the sixties and seventies, things have changed. What was once a growth industry has matured into a commodity business. Changes are occurring, of course, but they are coming slowly. Prices for shipping a container will likely remain fixed unless there is a change in technology that allows for more profitability for the lucky early adopters of the new technology.

A rough timeline of the changes in the industry shows changes in the container itself, the crane used to pick it up and either place in on or off the ship, the technology imbedded in the ship, the size of the ship, the speed of the ship and the ship's likely fuel economy. Quite a list.

The containers have gotten larger year by year. The early ones were six and a half feet tall. I notice that they're now nine and a half feet tall. Looks like the length has stayed constant at forty feet. The container itself is not likely to change too much, especially in a way that effects a Mexican port. Perhaps, the containers could get even larger than they are today - say fifty-five feet long versus today's forty feet - but that would require huge investments in cranes at every port the ships call at. The trucks would need a change. Finally, who is going to fill up a fifty-five foot long container?

Cranes are crucial. They're the key element that trap a ship in port, a losing proposition for the ship owner who isn't making any money unless the ship is under way to the next port. That means two things: there have to be enough cranes. The cranes that are available must be fast a both unloading a ship, and loading it. Mexico could compete here if they buy the newest, best cranes and keep them up-graded.

Ship technology continues to evolve. Early ships were converted WW II tankers. No longer. The ships are behemoths. The interactions between the cranes and the ships are computerized to ensure that the correct containers are swapped at the right time and that the ship is trimmed properly (flipping in port used to be a problem, way back when) at all times. There may be a place for more growth in the size of a ship, but it is my bet that the best place for improvement is in fuel economy and speed. That means hull design - and maybe even surface designs - that reduce drag from water and air might increase profitability.

All this ship design doesn't effect Mexican ports any more than American ports, unless there is some way to equate ship design with port utility. American ports are becoming more and more environmentally conscious, so Mexico may be able to take advantage of that, at least for the short term. Alternatively, the ship owners, or the shippers themselves (the ones that own the product in the containers), may be able to make a case to their customers that an environmentally friendly port helps them. Mexico has the opportunity to build green technologies into their port that exceed American technologies - and that reduce costs or time in port for shippers.

The California ports need help getting the containers to the trains. Congestion seems to be great between the ports and the train hubs in the Inland Empire of Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. If Mexican operator can negotiate with the rail roads to place an adequate train hub at the port, that could create an advantage, enough to reduce crucial shipping costs. Time is money, after-all. In this time of security checks at borders, it seems that a technology solution for speeding the containers over the border could make the Mexican proposal sensible.

Since some of the rail lines in Mexico will probably be new, there may be speed technologies that could be built into them as well as into the trains themselves. Fuel economy is still important as is speed to market. Some changes might be possible especially if the infrastructure is newly constructed with new, "buried" technologies.

Mexico may be able to add fuel to the ships to the equation. If they were able to fuel ships cheaply while they are in port, there may be pennies to be saved, enough to tip the balance toward the Mexican location. Same for the trains.

The Long Beach/Los Angeles ports are up and running. Yes, they are making continual improvements. If the Mexican port was able to make all the suggested changes add up to reduced shipping costs - and reduced time in port - they might have a case for creation and expansion of their proposed port.

If we think of all this from the US side of the border, the same suggestions apply. If the trains can't cross the border, the Mexican port can't pencil out. Alternatively, the US ports can make environmental and efficiency changes that increase the odds that their ports are cheap enough and speedy enough to hold their current clientele and attract others.

A lot of pencils are going to need pushing on this deal before it is done.  The shippers may perceive savings in dropping containers in a Mexican port. The investments to make that happen will be large - and risky - for all sides.

Reference

Dickerson, Marla. Mexico plans huge Baja port for U.S. trade. LA Times. 28 August 2008. http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mexico28-2008aug28,0,844963.story

Levinson, Marc. The Box. How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and World Economy Bigger. Princeton University Press. 2006.

Speedo's Disruptive Olympics

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We all know Speedo for their sleek racing swimwear designs from way back when. We also know that Speedo made Michael Phelps' swim suit at the recent Olympics where he won all his medals. What we probably didn't realize was that Nike also made swimwear for the Olympics, but it just wasn't as good as Speedo's. In fact, some of the swimmers sponsored by Nike were allowed to use Speedo equipment (Associated Press).

Speedo's been around a long time. They've probably made changes to their products in a sustainable fashion, meaning that they make incremental changes to increase utility and speed, but didn't shake things up too much. Until now. Their new swim wear really shook up these Olympics with demonstrably successful changes that won medals. Sustainable changes mean slow, incremental changes.

Disruptive changes shake things up. It looks like Speedo had a disruptive change going on as their latest upgrades helped swimmers in their suits win more medals.

The most interesting part of the story is yet to come: apparently, Nike is abandoning the swimwear market and leaving it to Speedo (Associated Press). It looks like Nike wasn't able to effectively out-perform Speedo in the engineering department where it counted. Nike left a market to a smaller, seemingly more innovative company. It'll be interesting to see if and when they return.

Reference

Associated Press. Nike to exit elite swimwear market. New York Times. 22 September 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Nike-Swimwear.html

Disruptive Behavior in the Banking Mess

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Everything was fine, until everything on Wall Street was not fine. Now two old players in the investment banking business are more bank, less investment. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, after resisting change and insisting all was well, have changed their stripes and are now regulated bank holding companies (White). Less risk. Lower rewards. That's Wall Street today.

In parallel, as the investment banks become less investment and more bank, the remaining investment bankers are looking to build market share. Jefferies & Company and Evercore Partners are thinking of becoming more dominant in the new Wall Street (Story).

The rules have changed. The deck has been re-shuffled, disrupted. Disruptive strategies have pretty set processes, although they aren't sometimes obvious.

  • Simple as compared to complex strategies make more sense. Warren Buffet said back in 2003 some of the derivatives he was looking at "weapons of financial mass destruction (Serwer, 24)." I think that pretty well describes some of the products that failed in the last couple of months.
  • Cheap launches are more likely to succeed.
  • Speed to market is a good indicator of future success for technology companies. It might be a predictor for service companies as well.
  • Disruptive companies might actually not be as good as their competition. They'll have fewer bells and whistles on their products, but they'll be simple and easy to understand.
  • Innovation in tech products does show, usually in unique design features that make the experience easier or more fun. Making a service product more fun makes it easier to use if done correctly.

The bigger investment banks are becoming more commercial and will probably leave opportunities for smaller investment banks to grow. Some people say the big companies will retain their business; others say the little guys have a change (Story). It seems to me that, if handled correctly, the smaller banks have a chance if they follow the disruptive strategy game-plan.

References

Serwer, Andy and Allan Sloan. The Price of Greed. Time. 29 September 2008. 32.

Story, Louise. As the Giants of Wall Street Topple, Smaller, Nimbler Rivals Move In. New York Times. 23 September 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23streets.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin

White, Ben and Louise Story. Last Two Big Investment Banks Reinvent Their Businesses. New York Times. 23 September 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23streets.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin

Disruptive Technology: Smaller Companies Have the Edge

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Bare bones. Light weight-three buttons only. Affordable-$120 versus $340 industry average. Shy - there's a word to describe a new product. Sales in the first year of one million units versus six million for the whole camcorder industry (Jana). What's the product? Pure Digital's Flip camcorder.

Disruptive technology? Yes. Why? There's a question.

  • Sony owns the business. They invented light weight as in the first Walkman. They just forgot that people weren't interested in a new feature. They were interested in a simple camcorder that would take simple movies that could be simply shown on the Internet.
  • The Flip isn't as good. The paint is cheaper. The lens probably isn't as good. Nobody cares. They probably don't notice, as most of the video shot with the Flip is ending up on low-res outputs like a laptop.
  • Sony takes it's time, relatively. Innovation is progressing more rapidly at Pure Digital. They were able to ship a million units in the first year with no trouble - and not troubles, as well. Pure Digital started in the throw-away-camera business. Simple things that got thrown away quickly. Their customers said they wanted a throw-away camcorder. It ended up being not quite throw-away, but close. New products are coming out quickly.
  • The Flip is so simple, you can't up-grade it. No additional memory sticks to worry about.
  • It's low tech as the Flip works on regular batteries. No bricks or cords.
  • No cords to down-load the movie. The USB "flips" out at the press of a button, thus the name. Nothing to lose. Nothing to go find when you're ready to see your production.
  • The Flip software actually isn't cutting edge at all. It's not perfect. It's just good enough to do the job. Most people are satisfied with what they get for the price they paid.

Evidence of disruptive technology:

  • Simple
  • Cheap
  • Faster to market with new up-grades
  • Maybe not quite as good as what out there, but useful.
  • One or two unique features that pique folks interest, probably based on very good design elements.

Oprah raved about it on her show. Rosie O'Donnel likes it as well (Jana). Think simple for your next new product.

References

Christensen, Clayton M. The Innovator's Dilemma. When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. Harvard Business School Press. 1997.

Christensen, Clayton M. and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator's Solution. Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Harvard Business School Press. 2004.

Jana, Reena. incase: How the Flip - a bare-bones digital camcorder-grew from a simple idea to a contender among giants like Sony. BusinessWeek. 28 April 2008. 76. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_17/b4081076893508.htm

If They Build the Port, Will Anybody Come?

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Think tiny. That's the size of Punta Colonet, a hamlet 150 miles south of Ensenada on the Baja Pacific coast.

Think huge. That's the size of the container port - and the investment at $4-billion - the Mexican government plans to install in Punta Colonet.

Big names are involved too. It is said that Carlos Slim Helu, the world's second richest man, is interested in bidding on the project. He's teamed with the Mexican railroad and mining company Grupo Mexico and Ports America Group, a port management company from New Jersey.

"The goal of the project is to make Mexico more competitive," says Miguel Favela, head of Mexican operation for Ports America (Dickerson)." They envision a city of 200,000 surrounding a port with a capacity of 2 million shipping containers a year, compared to LA/Long Beach's 15.7 million last year (Dickerson).

The big risk? The port has to hook up to American rail systems somewhere. The railroads are mum about whether they'll get involved.

Reference

Dickerson, Marla. Mexico plans huge Baja port for U.S. trade. LA Times. 28 August 2008. http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mexico28-2008aug28,0,844963.story

Competition versus Collaboration in the Cancer Wars

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Old way: compete with other cancer researchers for scarce funds. Focus on cancers with big populations of effected folks. Don't share results because someone may use those results to get funds for research you want for yourself and your team. The result? Solving the cancer  problem takes longer than it should. Some people with "unpopular" cancers die before their time.

New way: Communities in the health care battles create a business plan that focuses on measurable results from efforts supported across the scientific disciplines. Scientists collaborate on results instead of compete for funding. Collaboration takes a different form: the funding sources essentially hire scientists with the different skill sets and set them to work with scientists from other laboratories, all of them focusing on a broader problem (or specific problem if it makes sense) than would normally be addressed. Divisions within the community lessen. Collaboration ensures that crucial data is shared earlier. More people live longer.

The final product isn't a scientific paper. It is a result. A treatment is produced rather than a paper.

Funding sources are taking note by using a Silicon Valley approach. They're "paying for profits" (Saporito, 5) instead of waiting around. The focus on delivering a working pharmaceutical has reduced development time from a decade to four years in certain instances. Specific, targeted cancers with limited populations especially benefit from the targeted approach.

Ultimately, it is uncertain whether the new approach to cancer treatment is the right way to go. The focus on communication, sharing of information, and collaboration in an engineering and biological environment hopefully will yield results faster than today's norm.

Reference

Saporito, Bill. He Won His Battle With Cancer. Time. 4 September 2008. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1838776,00.html

August 31, 2008

Shipping's Disruptive Technology

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If I were to ask you what shipping technology innovation in the last fifty years was truly disruptive I'll bet that many of you would say "FedEx" and Freddie Smith's innovations related to fast shipment. You'd be wrong.

The big innovation was the creation of the container, the big steel or aluminum box that allowed trucks to easily transfer their cargos to trains or ships. Total disruption of an industry - actually the creation of an industry - occurred in the fifties and sixties. Innovations continue to solidify the strength of the innovation.

Previously, a shipper called a forwarder which picked up its products, commingled them with other shipments, delivered them to a warehouse to be commingled again with hundreds of other truckloads, literally hand-carried them aboard a ship going essentially the correct direction, and, months later, your shipment arrived (hopefully in one piece) at your destination.

The container changed all that. We all know about containers and what a container load of product speeding across the Pacific from a manufacturer to a retail operation in the US has done for the level of commerce - and profits - for all the companies involved. There's a case to be made that containers, by speeding the delivery time of final goods and raw materials, cut inventories and spawned the whole just-in-time manufacturing successes of the eighties and nineties.

Applause is in order at this point. By now, all this is pretty obvious.

So, let's say that the container was disruptive. What were it's characteristics?

  • The first container shipments were highly risky as rapid interactions between trucks, trains and ships didn't exist.
  • The container itself didn't exist. There were no standards on size or strength. All that came later.
  • Regulations were so strict that most shippers didn't want to know about the innovation as they were willing to accept the level of profitability that the government dictated in trade for protection from competitors.
  • Prices on shipping came down so low that they became, essentially, commodity-like. Lots of container shipping companies went out of business, were bought or were strung together in some sort of roll-up.
  • Bigness became the goal as did speed. Peripheral innovations in dock cranes, truck and railroad access to docks and traffic patterns created ancillary new businesses in manufacturing, inventory control and forwarding.
  • Since no one knew how to control growth, growth got out of hand and almost killed the industry until governments and coalitions formed to regulate prices and routes.

One man, Malcolm P. McLean, dreamed up the container business. He went near-bankrupt several times during the growth of the industry. He was lucky as the Viet Nam war required the effective shipment of goods to a location that had no organization to receive the incredible bulk of shipments that the war required. He was able to take care of government pricing and the fact that, since no one had ever done what he was doing before, he could innovate on the fly. His biggest risk was an interesting one, especially when dealing with the government: he bid all his deliveries to Viet Nam on a fixed-cost basis meaning that if he got it wrong, he lost big-time. Luckily for McLean, he figured out how to make money at containerized deliveries before he went bankrupt.

Strategically, mission became crucial. McLean realized that his business was moving cargo, not sailing ships or driving trucks (Levinson, 53). Early on, containerized shipping was a niche business (Levinson, 161). As growth occurred, the evolution from niche (with its greater profitability) to mainstream (with its lower profitability and greater volume) followed curves we are all used to. McLean survived the shift - mostly - and created a new industry, an industry that allowed much of the global growth we see today.

Reference

Levinson, Marc. The Box. How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and World Economy Bigger. Princeton University Press. 2006.

Trust Your Values. Act on Your Values

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David Begelman was caught embezzling from the corporation. Alan Hirschfield knew it, but he delayed doing anything about it. The delay cost Hirschfield his job, ultimately, but not in the way you might think.

The Board of Directors sided not with Hrischfield, the CEO of the corporation, but with Begelman, the President of one of the divisions and close friend of many on the Board.

Yes, ultimately, Begelman lost his job, too, but only after the press and the SEC started to weigh in.

The company? Columbia Pictures in 1976.

The story is part of the lore of Hollywood, certainly one that isn't important today, you might think. Actually, it says a lot about a lot of things.

Hirschfield discovered that the Board was truly in charge of Columbia Pictures. The Board room battle became fierce during a year when Columbia was quite successful, with Hirschfield and Begelman playing large roles in that success. Of course, the Board's in charge in any corporation, even a successful one owing a lot of that success to the CEO.

Personalities played a large role, as did long friendships between Board members and senior managers.

Begelman had stolen money by fraudulently creating and endorsing company checks made out to other individuals. The right thing to do was to fire Begelman immediately and move on, or so it seems. Hirschfield delayed firing Begelman allowing internal pressures and alliances to magnify the situation, ultimately effecting morale and profitability.

So, you find something going wrong in your company, but you are not just sure who did what. The first step is to investigate, quickly. Then make a decision, act, and move on. That's obvious. Hirschfield decided to delay the obvious because the Board wanted him to. Then the fights really began. They became worse because it became not just a battle of right versus wrong, but one of alliances and power structures battling each other.

No one really won in the long run.

Pick your Board very carefully, especially in a publicly traded organization. Investigate problems quickly and then act on the findings. Finally, leave personalities and alliances out of the right versus wrong discussion.

As McClintick makes clear, this was easier said than done. It's still good advice. In the parlance of strategy, Hirschfield knew his values. The problem was that he didn't act on his values quickly enough.

Reference

McClintick, David. Indecent Exposure. A True Story of Hollywood and Wall Street. William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1982.

August 25, 2008

History Repeats Itself - Forget at Your Peril

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In 1907 there was a huge recession. The Federal Reserves System was created. Everyone said there wouldn't be another recession - ever. In 1929 we all know what happened. We forget that there was an initial, severe market break eight years earlier, in 1921. The Go-Go Years of 1969 were just the same. Everyone claimed that there couldn't be a bust. Everything was protected. They didn't know about a shudder caused by insider trading in 1966 (Brooks, 4).

Brooks wrote his history of the formation of mutual funds in the fifties and sixties and their effect on the wealth markets in 1973. It's a great historical synopsis of the sixties boom - let's call it the conglomerateur boom - and the early seventies bust that followed almost as a direct result. The parallels to the twenties pool operators (as in investment pool) are remarkable and significant, especially when you consider the investment pool boom as a parallel to the rise of the mutual fund in like fashion.

1921 mini-bust. 1929 big bust.

1966 mini-bust. 1970 big bust.

2001 "mini-bust"? 2006 big bust? Interesting.

History repeats itself.

Different players. Different stories. Same result. Interesting.

The History of the "Hedged" Fund

Buy a stock. Hedge the purchase with a short sale. Makes sense, yes? If you pool a bunch of investments together, you have the first hedge fund (Brooks, 142).  This was in 1949. The rising stock market gave the fund its biggest problem - they couldn't find enough stocks to short with. Nice problem to have. Until the mid-sixties, the initial fund had no competition. They didn't advertise. It was all amongst friends in a basically unregulated, and very profitable, marketplace. They forgot one thing: the market was always rising. Their hedges were untested. They'd end up failing with the rest of the market in the early seventies.

Sound familiar?

The History of the Conglomerate

Make your company hugely profitable. Use the stock, which now is highly priced, to buy the stocks of less highly valued companies, and create a conglomerate. That's what they were doing in the sixties. One cute little accounting wrinkle is forgotten, but still good to remember. Merge a company with a high multiple (a high P/E) with a company with a lower P/E, and, suddenly, the acquiring company with the higher P/E has an even higher P/E, which it may then use to buy another lower P/E company. It goes on and on, theoretically, and wonderfully, if you are an investor. It works for a while, yes. But, it's all a pyramid. It all fall apart eventually (Brooks, 158).

Every time I get involved in some sort of stock purchase, especially with a start-up, I hope I remember the history of the stock market. Yes, there is money to be made. Yes, consider every way you are considering to make money in the stock market. Someone probably already did it, and there might be lessons to remember.

Reference

Brooks, John. The Go-Go Years. Weybright and Talley. 1973.

When Mortgages Were First Bundled - In 1979

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What with the current debacle in the home mortgage market, we forget that this isn't the first time home mortgages wrecked the securities markets. It seems that folks have decided that this is something new. Well, time to re-think that one.

Wall Street started trading residential home mortgages in the late seventies when Salomon Brothers, realizing that the savings and loans were dominating a market place that had real possibilities for packaging loans and selling them to investors, started the ball rolling. In 1980 the mortgage market surpassed the equity markets on size alone (Lewis, 83).

A simple analysis of what happened then might include the words "hayseed" (for the thrift industry managers) and "shark" (for the Wall Street sales people). Wall Street sharks ended up bundling mortgages and selling them to the hayseed thrifts. Why? Thrifts were limited in the markets they could sell mortgages to, but, and here is the big but, they wanted to grow. How to grow? Buy mortgage backed securities from Wall Street. They were able to expand their portfolios, lessen their risks, and become more profitable, all at the same time.

We all know what happened. The thrift crisis is a thing of beauty, to be studied in Harvard case studies for years.

One thing has happened. The knowledge we gained from the thrift crisis was forgotten. Harvard - or somebody - didn't do their job. Once again we have mortgage backed securities threatening the market.

My point? Studying history is boring for some folks. At the same time, history is crucial, as it allows us to avoid mistakes that have been make before.

A little bit of soap box story telling? Probably. A good idea to check your new strategy against the history of your industry? Absolutely. You might learn something that will save you a bundle.

Reference

Lewis, Michael. Liar's Poker. Rising Through the Wreckage on Wall Street. Penguin Books. 1989.

August 19, 2008

Bonfire Euphoria - and Failure

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You work on a team to create a movie. The team does its best work. Things go wrong, yes. But things also go right. Who is to know whether it will all come together in the end?

Bonfire of the Vanities was a Tom Wolfe book about the breakdown of New York City during the eighties. If Wolfe is good at anything, he is good a portraying a time and the people in it.

They made the movie some years later. Salamon was able to watch closely as Brian DePalma tried to make his masterpiece under all sorts of constraints.

The book's big. It tells a lot about movie making. What about the strategy in it all?

Who does strategy? Let's assume it is senior management's job to put a team together, go away, and put a simple plan down on paper. Then they come back, articulate the strategy to their team (hopefully in a manner that everyone understands what they mean) and, then, sit back while other implement their plans.

The management team provides guidance, advice, critiques along the way, and, if it is normal, gets so involved in the day-to-day that they forget that a plan even exists.

The Bonfire team did the same thing. The constraints of the movie business are huge and the odds of success are not so huge. The management team watched, cajoled, screamed (especially over budget) and, when things were all done and they were shown the final cut, applauded - loudly - about the "masterpiece" (Salamon, 340) DePalma had created. 

The first weekend's revenues for Bonfire were $3.1 million (Salamon, 405), a bomb by anyone's standards.

First question: Is movie production art or business? If it is business, what do you do when things are going wrong?

There are points along the way when you have a feeling something is going wrong. It happens in your business. DePalma and his team certainly recognized things were going wrong when they couldn't find film locations, or their actors weren't performing up to expectations.

They never thought about pulling the plug on the production. Too many big names were involved, and, once things got started, to pull back would have wasted too much capital.

They had to absorb their losses and move forward. Sometimes you have to do that. You just wish that you had responded earlier when things just didn't feel right.

Reference

Salamon, Julie. The Devil's Candy. The Bonfire of the Vanities Goes to Hollywood. Houghton Mifflin Company. 1991.

August 18, 2008

Old Way Strategy at Disney

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The battle was essentially complete. Eisner was out; Bob Iger was in. Disney was under new management at long last after an epic battle for control of the board. Eisner was a lame duck awaiting his final day a couple months down the road.

Among Iger's first jobs? Dismantle the strategic planning department (Stewart, 538).

If you go back to the beginning of strategy at Disney, you see why the department was created in the first place.

Eisner was a new hire, having come aboard in September 1984. He toured the parks (which he had never visited as a kid), heard about plans for new hotels at Disney World, and met Gary Wilson the Marriott Corporation's Chief Financial Officer. Marriott had been eyeing Disney as an acquisition candidate not so long before and was involved in designing the new hotels at Disney World. Wilson had been part of the team gathering information about Disney as they prepared their bid (Stewart, 62-66). Soon as he could, Eisner hired Wilson.

Wilson almost immediately hired a series of Marriott executives to establish a strategic planning department at Disney. They had five year plans for all the divisions and targeted 20/20 growth: twenty percent growth in earnings each year and 20 percent growth in stock price each year (Stewart, 66 and 200). Leverage their cash flow to buy companies in industries related to Disney became part of the planning, especially broadcast companies (Stewart 201).

You know things are going badly for the strategic planning department when everyone starts to call it's members the "goon squad," labeling them "arrogant and insensitive" (Stewart, 231).

So, what went wrong at Disney? Stewart's point of view is pretty clear. Strategic planning's "scrutiny" coupled with Eisner's willingness to "intrude" on all sorts of matters at all levels around the company caused "dismay" among the executives (Stewart, 231), enough so that many of them were thinking about leaving.

You're a CEO. You like to know what's happening. You even like to push things to happen along the lines you select. What's wrong with that? Nothing, as long as you're a relatively small company. When you get big, things change.

Risk is avoided, opportunities missed, finance acquires new strength, power shifts to corporate staff - simply, inertia reigns (Adizes, 88).

CEOs pretty much know what to do, but sometimes they are unwilling to.

Actually, that is why Eisner was so successful. He came into a bureaucratic organization and initially had great success at shaking things up. Most of what he did worked. Ultimately, however, he couldn't stay successful. He couldn't or wouldn't trust his team to manage, even after he had broken up some of the most dysfunctional bureaucracies. That was his undoing.

Oh, yes. And what to do about strategy at Disney - or your company? My advice is, when it feels like a bureaucracy, it is a bureaucracy. Ditch the bureaucracy, if you have it. If you don't, nurture what you have.

References

Adizes, Ichak. Corporate Lifecycles. How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do About It. Prentice Hall. 1988.

Stewart, James B. Disney War. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. 2005.

August 13, 2008

Selling Something? Proof That Three Options Work Best

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I thought relationship marketing was all about people. Make more acquaintances, build more relationships, sell more. Maybe not.

Let's redefine relationships. Let's say you're selling something. People are interested in buying, but don't really know what to pay or even whether they should buy, or what to buy. You need to help the solve the problem. The first step? Figure out how to give them something - a related product or service - free.

We have been working on this with one of my clients. He sells granite counter tops. To make the hole for the sink, he simply cuts out a bit of the sheet of granite, and, basically, throws it away. We've been talking about something different. Instead of throwing it away, he gives it, after proper edging, free, to his customer. It becomes a freebie. Customer gets a wonderful granite counter top - and a free matching cutting board. The counter top is less likely to become scratched by carving knives, looks better, lasts longer.

Why do this? Well, people ask for a bunch of quotes on counter tops, from all sorts of suppliers. My client has found a way to differentiate himself from the other suppliers. The free cutting board is enough to tip things his way.

What happened here? All things being equal, my client has tipped things his way by making them unequal. Buy from him get not only the best countertop available (I'm convinced - you ought to see his work) but get a free cutting board that matches your kitchen exactly. Who else gives that? And for free, at that.

Customers have choices. They can buy the cheapest option, which, without options, they generally will do. They could buy the most expensive option, something they're less likely to do. But, give them something free, and, amazingly, they're more likely to buy from you.

There're lots of other examples in Ariely's book. Magazine subscriptions. Homes. Basically, he points out why people make choices. If you think about how those choices are made, you can help them buy more of your products or services. Very powerful ideas. 

References.

Ariely, Dan. Predictably Irrational. The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. Harper. 2008.

August 12, 2008

IBM's Transformation - In 1955 - Is Still Relevant

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IBM was at a fork in the road in 1955. They had a choice between two possibilities, one "safer" than the other.

  • They could grow rapidly by focusing their efforts on computers, a risky vision at best as the number of installed computers probably numbered in the tens or hundreds.
  • Or, basically, they could retain the status quo by slowing things down and focusing on what they did best, manufacture punch cards and the related rental equipment, all very profitable (Watson, 253).

What to do?

Anyone who knows anything about the Watson's - the father/son duo who consecutively managed IBM for years - knows exactly what they did. They, meaning Tom Watson's son and Al Williams, a senior manager, bet the farm, but in a good way. Their plan? Transform the company.

  • They professionalized management, by installing a "chain of command, large-scale decentralization, a planning process," and "formal business policies (Watson, 253)." 
  • They created an organization chart and split up some of the responsibilities that had reported to the Tom Watson, the father.
  • Headquarters worried about computers and punch-card equipment. All the other products like "military products, typewriters, punch cards, and time clocks" (Watson, 254) were spun out into new divisions under their own management.

Another key change occurred away. It was driven by the market in a way, but it required a risk-taking attribute that ensured that IBM would continue to grow. The strategy is pretty simple stated: Make stuff, but don't customize it. In the IBM case that meant, sell computers, but figure out how to sell the same configuration over and over again. Yes, the initial few down the production line were hugely expensive, but over time the costs of manufacturing came down and they were able to take advantage of the scaling up of the manufacturing lines to reduce costs.

The first product IBM scaled up in this manner was a general purpose scientific computer that they pre-sold to government laboratories (Watson, 205). Later, they found out that there was only one little flaw in their plans. Their initial computer, called the Defense Computer, was initially priced at $8,000 a month. When production began, they found that the correct price might be as much as $18,000 a month (Watson, 228), obviously a big difference. First amazing discovery in computers for IBM: the customers still wanted the computer. That changed a lot of minds at IBM about the future of computers (Watson, 228).

The real transformation of IBM into a computer company didn't occur until the introduction of the IBM System 360, a 360 degree machine meant to be sold to both the scientific and business markets in all sorts of configurations. The investment came to more that $5 billion dollars, certainly a "bet the farm" undertaking. Three big problems presented themselves: hardware design for all the different configuration, and software design totaling millions of lines of code, all at the same time IBM was trying to manufacture its own electronic parts (Watson, 346-349). The biggest decision of all was whether to announce the complete line piecemeal, or to show it all at once. They chose the later and, even though they had to use mockups in the original product showings, ultimately pulled it off.

Mission statements (What is or product or service? What marketplace do we sell to?) actually play a big part in the story. Early on, IBM was a punch card company. It almost stayed that way, thus missing, almost, the huge growth in data processing in all its myriad forms.

Joe Nocera, writing in the New York Times, calls this one of the ten best business books ever. An interesting read.

Reference

Novera, Joe. The Best Business Books Ever? New York Times. 17 July 2008. http://executivesuite.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/17/the-best-business-books-ever-index.html?hp

Watson, Thomas J., Jr. Father Son & Co. My Life at IBM and Beyond. Bantam Books.1990.

July 22, 2008

Articulating Strategy Is As Important As Creating It

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The servants always know when something is going wrong in their "master's" home, sometimes before their master. 

Speechwriters are the same way.

Peggy Noonan (she worked in the Reagan White House as a speech writer) tells of a late request to complete a Bush I State of the Union address - five days before the address (Noonan, 94). It was evidence of lack of something - leadership, perhaps. Her estimate was that things weren't well in the White House.

Speechwriters also know when something is going right in the White House. The evidence is how much access they have to the President to make sure that what they write reflects what the President is actually thinking.

All the Presidents had important lines that delineated what they were thinking. All along there has been someone in the background providing the lines. And there was a President who made the delivery of the lines his business. Reagan was called the great communicator. He worked as closely with his speech-writing team as any president. Such lines as "we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil ..." (Schlesinger, 331) came from Reagan himself. Everyone said "you can't say that", "it can't be done." Reagan said it, went down that path, and made the words and the thoughts behind them stick. He thought it (his thought went back at least to the fifties, if not the forties) and he said it. The words drove his initiatives for the rest of his presidency.

What about CEOs? I saw a Gateway CEO wing it in front of an audience about a year ago. If I am not mistaken he is gone now. His words didn't really say anything. I heard a Boeing executive, who ended up CEO, speak. His words reflected his status. They were exciting, provided a vision for the future, and were actionable. I heard a COO of a housing company speak. His words were specific, laden with actionable thoughts, and the internal crowd loved it.

Which brings us around to you, and your strategy, and what your say when people ask you to speak. I've been doing this long enough that I ought to have the specific answer for every case. There are models - Kennedy and Reagan certainly were inspiring - for success. There are models for how to construct what you're going to say. We say, "What's your product, what's your marketplace. Don't talk about anything but that when you're talking about your mission statement."

What's right for you? Values count, so I'd delineate my values - and the company values - pretty early in the process. You have to make a decision about hierarchies. Do customers go first, or employees? What about the environment? Green is big right now. Is it going to be a heartfelt problem at your company, or marketing hype? You get to decide. I continue to be sure that people are listening more than you might assume. If you are going to speak, spend time on what you are going to say. It is important.

References

Noonan, Peggy. Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. Random House. 1994. 

Schlesinger, Robert. White House Ghosts. Presidents and Their Speechwriters. Simon & Schuster, Inc. 2008.

July 21, 2008

Bipolar Planning: Is the Goal Happiness - or Adventure?

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I can't decide, so you'll just have to do some thinking on your own.

Ferriss has some original thoughts about how to succeed. His topic is the four hour work week, or how to design a business that sheds a lot of cash flow without requiring much oversight.

One of his interesting concepts is focusing not on the happiness your lifestyle produces, but rather on the adventure you have enough time to persue. Two basicallly similar, but opposite, ideas, if you think about it. Ferriss says that it's not the amount of happiness you feel, but the amount of excitement you feel that measures real success (Ferriss, 51).

Heffernan isn't accepting any of it. She points out that Ferriss achieves some of his gains by cheating and skipping important steps (Heffernan). I agree.

And I'll also say I understand both sides in the discussion.

My read on the right way to go? This is tricky. I've mentioned in the past (Mixner) that innovating and succeeding in new areas requires a bit of stretch, or perhaps, even, a little bit of stress. Clearly Heffernan is stressed by Ferriss' ideas on ways to create enough cash flow to live indepently.

Somehow, I feel good about what Ferris has to say and might try a little bit of stress myself, especially if it allows me time for more adventure.

References

Ferriss, Timothy. The 4-Hour Workweek. Escapte 9-5, Live Anywhere, and Join the New Rich. Crown Publishers. 2007.

Heffernan, Virginia. Advice Squad. The New York Times. 20 July 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/books/review/Heffernan-t.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin

Mixner, Jack. First Step to Innovation: Build New Habits. http://mixnerstrategy.com/blog/2008/05/first_step_to_innovation_build.html

Political Websites Edge Towards Business

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There is a reason Barack Obama's campaign has been so successful at raising money. It's called Blue State Digital.

Their successes:

  • $200 million raised online
  • Two million phone calls made on the candidates behalf
  • 850,000 social networkers
  • 50,000 campaign events (Lowry, 56).

Blue State is eyeing AT&T and Stonyfield Farm for next big projects. They are also talking about working for the White House, eventually. Just gotta win the campaign. 

It is looking more and more like, if you have a good idea, having the right web folks on your side makes a big difference. If you have the right folks creating, you are able to test your ideas in days or weeks as opposed to the months and months it used to take to create a web site and test your ideas. Prices are going down, as well, allowing you to generate revenues AND profits, a tidy situation, especially if you need to approach venture capitalists.